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Abstract
Many countries provide extensive in-kind public transfers for specific needs of
particular client groups such as the elderly, the disabled, and children. However, this
may crowd out private expenditures on the goods in question and, to some extent,
undermine the case for not simply giving cash. If the target group belongs to a larger
household the mechanism behind this crowding out could be either altruism or
agency. This paper is concerned with three nutrition programmes for children in UK1
households: free lunch at school for children from poor households; free milk to poor
households with pre-school children; and free milk at day-care for pre-school
children in attendance regardless of parental income. We exploit a reform that
removed eligibility to the first two programs from working poor households. We find
significant crowding-out of private food expenditures – a free school lunch reduces
food expenditure by around 15% of the purchase price of the lunch, and a free pint
of milk reduces milk expenditure by about 80% of the market price. We conclude
that this is due to altruism rather than agency problems because milk expenditure
crowd-out is similar across milk programs that have different delivery mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Economists have frequently argued that cash transfers Pareto dominate in-kind
transfers. However, this argument is inherently a first-best one and there are several other
arguments in favor of in-kind transfers that are valid in a second-best world. For example,
in-kind transfers are often used where agency problems may be an issue: this might arise
when policy is specifically concerned with the welfare of an individual but a cash transfer
cannot be made directly to the intended recipient (see Cox and Jakubson (1995)). A
second argument relates to the desire to exploit the stigma associated with visibly being in
receipt of some transfer, in order to improve the targeting of such transfers to the most
needy. This may be most relevant in circumstances where recorded income is not a good
indicator of well-being, for example in an economy with a large underground sector (see
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), and Besley and Coate (1992a,b)). Both of these
arguments suggest that an in-kind transfer is not valued as highly as cash by the recipient:
in the first case because the agent cannot trade the transfer for cash from which rent could
be extracted; and in the second case because the value of the transfer is net of the costs of
the stigma
1.
The fact that in-kind transfers are worth more to the poor than to the rich, but
worth less than cash, moderates their use for poverty relief. Nonetheless, at the same time
as improving the targeting of expenditure to alleviate poverty, in-kind transfers may be
able to protect the welfare of children in poor households from adverse shocks associated
with variations in parental income. Indeed, this is precisely why many such schemes were
introduced. However, if family members are altruistically linked then an in-kind transfer
directly to one household member may be offset by some countervailing action by other
members. Thus, a major issue for welfare policy is the extent to which public transfers
displace private transfers and this depends on the extent of altruism. The “Rotten-kid”
phenomenon (see Becker (1976)) applies only if the household is at an interior solution of
1 See also Balestrino (1999) for an analysis of in-kind transfers when there are other distortionary taxes.3
its consumption problem
2 where the parent is making positive transfers. The Rotten Kid
Theorem severely undermines the case for making both cash and in-kind transfers to
individuals as opposed to households. One argument for providing in-kind transfers to
low income households with children is that this alleviates the effects of poverty on
children but does not undermine the work incentives of the parents. But if such transfers
can be offset by some corresponding intra-household reallocation then not only is the
affect on child welfare undermined but so too is the potential beneficial work incentive
effect since (at least some of) the benefit of the transfer intended for the child could be
appropriated by the parent.
This paper addresses the issue of the extent to which dependent children and their
parents are altruistically linked
3, as well as the more conventional issues of the extent to
which in-kind transfers crowd out private expenditure and are equivalent to cash
(considered, for example, by the US food stamp literature). There has been little research
in the UK on this and the few US studies have been directly concerned with these issues
are reviewed in Altonji, et al (1996), and Currie (1997). The former shows evidence
consistent with altruism as a motive for inter vivos transfers. The latter shows that a
school lunch program is subject to an offsetting nutrition reduction of about 50%, while a
school breakfast program is relatively effective with only modest nutritional offsets. More
recently, Bhattacharya, et al (2004) has considered the impact of the US school breakfast
program and confirms beneficial effects on nutrition, as well as evidence that it promotes
good eating habits, better eating of other family members, and has no adverse impact on
calorific intake
4.
2 Consumption of the commodity in the absence of the transfer should be greater than the quantity
transferred. Other conditions also apply, see Bergstrom (1997).
3 See Altonji et al (1995) for evidence of intergenerational altruistic links between parents and adult
children, and for a survey of altruism in the context of charitable giving see Rose-Ackerman (1996).
4 In contrast, evidence summarised in a special issue of the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition
(1995), suggests that school nutrition programs had much smaller impacts on nutrition intakes than Currie
suggests.4
The UK programs of interest here are: Free School Lunches for children from
poor households who attend school; Welfare Milk Tokens which can be exchanged for
milk and are available for poor households with pre-school children; and Day Care Milk
for pre-school children while attending registered childcare institutions regardless of
family circumstances. These programs can be informative because of their contrasts: Milk
is a good substitute for privately provided alternatives, while school lunches are a poor
substitute because of heterogeneous quality. Moreover, while Welfare Milk Tokens and
Day Care Milk both provide milk, they are delivered differently. The former is a transfer
to the mother, while the latter is given directly to the child at the institution. Importantly,
two of these programs were reformed in the middle of the observations period: poor
households with in-work parents lost eligibility to Welfare Milk Tokens and Free School
Lunches, whereas previously eligibility was for low income families both in- and out-of-
work. Day Care Milk continued to be provided regardless of circumstances.
Studies of the impact of the US food stamp program suggest an increase in food
spending despite almost all recipients spending more on food than the value of stamps.
Fraker et al (1995) finds an increase of 18-28% - perhaps because the stamps will
typically be given to the mother. However, this increase is less than the value of the
stamps: the marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamps is in the range 0.20
to 0.45 (see Kuhn et al (1996)) which is considerably more than the propensity to spend
on food out of marginal cash income according to most estimates of consumer demand.
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2006) also show positive effects of Food Stamps on
household food spending
5 by exploiting the differential introduction of the program
across states.
While much of the US food stamp research has been concerned with establishing
the value of such transfers to recipient households, we are concerned with the
implications of the individualistic nature of transfers to uncover the extent of altruism. It
5 In the context of a developing country, see also Del Ninno and Dorosh (2003).5
would also be desirable to look directly at child consumption or child outcomes (for
example health and test scores
6), however we examine only the effects of transferring
private goods (milk and food) on household expenditures which is a more direct way of
testing for altruism.
Evidence that nutrition programs significantly crowd out private food expenditure
would provide support to the proponents of cashing-out such transfers since typically in-
kind programs are more expensive to administrate than cash transfers. Moreover, a
proportion (the marginal budget share of food) of any cash-out would be allocated to
higher food expenditure by the household. More importantly, the question is also of more
general interest since altruism undermines the effectiveness of public transfers whether
they are cash or in-kind. There are two related questions here. First, providing cash, or a
good with close market substitutes like milk rather than a good with poor market
substitutes like school lunch, allows the parents to alter expenditure patterns. Second,
giving milk in day care where the authorities can ensure a child drinks it rather than
giving milk to the household where it may be consumed by any household member. We
think of differences in the former as revealing altruism and differences in the latter as
suggesting agency.
Our analysis is based on pooled cross-section data from the UK Family
Expenditure Surveys (FES) 1981-1992
7. The FES are detailed continuous surveys of
household expenditure patterns, demographic characteristics, income sources and transfer
receipts. We use 29,222 households containing dependent children to analyze household
milk and non-milk food expenditure and its relation to nutrition programs, while
controlling for food and milk prices, income and household characteristics.
6 See Currie (1997) and references therein for evidence that relates to housing programs and health
insurance. See also Browning (1992) who looks at anthropometric effects in developing countries.
7 Prior to 1981 free school lunch receipt is not recorded directly, although expenditure on school lunches is
recorded. After 1992 information about local taxes (called “rates”) has been removed from the public use
data and this undermines our ability to accurately compute welfare entitlements. Importantly, our period of
analysis bridges an important reform to nutrition programs.6
We exploit a reform
8 that occurred in 1988 which changed the eligibility
conditions for Free School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens, but not for Day Care Milk.
We use this natural experiment to identify the role of altruism by considering the
reformed programs separately, and combine all three programs in a structural model to
also test for agency. Furthermore, we use the fact that Free School Lunches are only
available during term time and school summer holidays in Scotland are a month earlier
than the rest of the UK.
Thus, we pursue a number of identification strategies: difference in differences
using grouped data, difference in differences using micro-data, and a structural approach
that explicitly models the determinants of program participation. The first strategy
assumes that the 1988 reform is a natural experiment, while the second strategy controls
for observed differences between the treatment and control groups and the changes in
these characteristics over time. As an alternative grouping of micro-data to the second
strategy, for Free School Lunches school holidays in Scotland and the rest of the UK are
used. The above strategies identify crowd-out. However, testing for agency by comparing
responses across reformed programs, and focusing on different delivery mechanisms,
might be confounded by other program differences in terms of type of transfer (food as
opposed to milk) and target group (younger as opposed to older children). To overcome
this, and help in interpreting the results, we estimate a structural model of the
determinants of participation in all three nutrition programs and of the budget shares.
Although Day Care Milk was not reformed, it has a target group of children of a similar
age to Welfare Milk Tokens and it is, of course, also just milk that is the ultimate object
of the transfer. Differences in the unobservable determinants of both program
participation and budget shares are allowed for by adopting restrictive distributional
assumptions (multivariate normality). However, this third strategy continues to exploit the
reforms for identifying agency from crowd-out effects, and complements this by allowing
8 This was known as the “Fowler reform” after Norman Fowler, the Health and Social Security Minister.7
the imposition of, and testing of, the theoretical restrictions suggested by the structural
specification.
The extent to which the nutrition program is close to cash, in the sense of having
close market substitutes, and how large provision is, relative to needs, are both important
determinants of the scope for agency. Milk has good market substitutes and Welfare Milk
Tokens provide a large proportion of (mean non-eligible household milk) expenditure
whereas Day Care Milk provides a small proportion. To anticipate our results, we find
that: these milk programs crowd out private milk expenditure by 80% of their value; and
Free School Lunches are poor substitutes for products available in the market and we
estimate that the private food expenditure crowd out is 15% of their value. We also infer
that agency problems are small from our finding that milk transfers have a similar crowd
out regardless of delivery mechanism: whether via the child’s day-care institution or via
welfare-eligible mother. Furthermore, milk transfers appear to have similar crowd-out
effects regardless of the size of provision relative to needs.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains briefly the UK welfare
system and changes that have occurred over time relevant to nutrition programs. Section 3
describes the stylized facts of the Family Expenditure Data. Section 4 presents, illustrates
and discusses estimates of our models for food expenditure and program participation.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. Cash and In-kind Transfer Programs in the UK
In-kind transfer programs have grown rapidly in the US and Slesnick (1996)
shows that they have played a major, but hitherto ignored, role in reducing poverty. In the
two decades prior to the mid 1990’s there had been a tendency for states to shift support
away from cash towards Food Stamps and extensions in Medicaid. Despite the erosion of
eligibility to the Food Stamp program (see Kuhn et al (1996))
9 that caused expenditure
9 In contrast to the direction of reform in the US, there have been calls for the Free School Lunch program
to be extended in the UK. For example, the Social Security Advisory Committee (1994) suggested that Free8
and caseload to fall from 1994, since 2000 these have climbed again almost to their 1994
peaks. Currently more than 26 million US households participate in food stamps,
receiving an average annual value of over $1200
10. Compared with the US, in-kind
transfers in the UK, with the exception of housing and health-related benefits, are largely
nutrition programs for households with children: Free School Lunches, Welfare Milk
Tokens and Day Care Milk. In the UK the topic also has renewed relevance because of
the launch of a food stamp program called Healthy Start, in November 2006
11, which will
provide vouchers, worth £150 annually, for milk, fruit and vegetables to pregnant
teenagers and mothers on welfare with children under age 4.
Several means-tested transfer programs provide benefits for households with
sufficiently low income and capital. The main UK cash programs during the 1980’s and
1990’s were Income Support, Housing Benefit, and Family Credit
12. There are
approximately 26 million households in the UK and a large number of households
participate in one or more programs
13 and they are expensive. The corresponding
programs in the US are respectively Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Housing
Subsidy, and Earned Income Tax Credit. The two UK cash programs of primary interest
here, Income Support and Family Credit, are described in more detail below.
Income Support is a cash transfer which is available to households where income
and capital are below a “needs” threshold. Needs are a function of household
School Lunches should be reintroduced for those receiving Family Credit because “more families would
move into work” and “there would be a benefit to children in terms of health and nutrition”.
10 See http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/fssummar.htm for details of the program.
11 See http://www.healthystart.nhs.uk/ .
12 Prior to 1988 Family Credit was called Family Income Supplement and Income Support was called
Supplementary Benefit. In 1999 Family Credit was replaced by Working Families Tax Credit and in 2003
by Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. While there are important administrative differences, the new
benefits are essentially more generous versions of their predecessors. We use the terminology Family Credit
and Income Support throughout.
13 2.1 million working age households and 2.7m pensioner households receive Income Support and Pension
Credit, 4.0m receive Housing Benefit, and 3.5m couples with children and 2.1m lone parents receive the
successor to Family Credit.9
demographic characteristics, and entitlement is a proportion of the amount that income
falls below these needs. Eligibility is subject to a weekly hours of work maximum above
which no household member can work, and there is a small weekly earnings disregard (a
ceiling below which household earnings do not affect entitlement to Income Support),
making Income Support essentially an out-of-work cash transfer program. It is largely
claimed by: the elderly (many of whom receive no pension by virtue of their previous
employment) as a supplement to their state-provided pension, the long term unemployed
(who have exhausted their eligibility to unemployment insurance benefits), the long-term
sick and disabled, and lone parents.
Family Credit is a cash transfer to households with dependent children.
Entitlement is a function of the difference between needs and income, subject to a
maximum entitlement. Needs are calculated as a function of household demographic
characteristics - different to that used for Income Support. Eligibility is subject to a
minimum weekly hours of work which at least one household member must satisfy.
Approximately half of all Family Credit is paid to lone parents.
The system was reformed in April 1988, but retained a broadly similar structure.
The central features of the reform were: synchronizing weekly hours of work limits at 16
(previously there was an eligibility overlap for Income Support and Family Credit in the
hours range 20-24); the income definition was now net of income tax and social security
(National Insurance) contributions, but there was no common definition of “needs”; and
Family Credit became more generous so that eligibility moved higher up the income
distribution.
In addition to these cash transfer programs, there are number of in-kind transfers.
Eligibilities to Free School Lunches, Welfare Milk Tokens and certain health benefits
(free prescription drugs, dental and optical care), are by virtue of receipt of an associated
cash transfer. These programs are extensive (caseloads are 1 million children receiving10
Free School Lunches
14, 0.2 million pre-school children in households receiving Welfare
Milk Tokens, 400 million prescriptions, 10.7 million visits to the dentist, and 3.7 million
eye tests in 1997) and expensive (respective annual costs of £150 million, £47 million,
£3400 million, £900 million, £55 million). Most UK health care costs, apart from
prescription drugs, dental and optical care, are financed through the National Health
Service which is a universal program. This is similar to one of largest US in-kind transfer
programs – Medicare which is a universal program for the elderly. Finally, Day Care Milk
is independent of cash welfare receipt and is simply contingent on attending a registered
day-care institution.
Free School Lunches are available each school day to children attending school
15
where a member of the household is receiving either of the cash transfers, Income
Support or Family Credit. After April 1988 the children of parents receiving Family
Credit were no longer entitled to Free School Lunches. Although Family Credit cash
entitlements were increased in 1988, this was not an exact cash-out of the in-kind
transfer, since families with children attending school received different increases
depending on the age of child.
Official statistics on the number of individuals entitled to Free School Lunches (or
any other in-kind transfer) are scanty. In 1984 15.9% of all pupils received Free School
Lunches (see Department of Social Security (1995)) and the daily charge for a school
lunch was £0.55. In 1992 14% of pupils received Free School Lunches. The same school
lunch could be bought by children from families ineligible to the waiver, so we observe
14 Child Poverty Action Group (2005) estimate that the 2004 figure is 1.4m children.
15 In the 1906 Education Act, Local Education Authorities were empowered to provide Free School
Lunches at their own discretion. In 1921 this was extended to free milk. Orr (1937) documented a link
between low-income, malnutrition and under-achievement in schools. In 1947 the School Milk Act ordered
the issue of a daily one-third of a pint of milk free to all state school pupils up to age 18. Free school milk
was withdrawn from secondary school (ages 12-18) in 1968, and further withdrawn from primary schools in
1971. However, implementation was slow as many Local Education Authorities continued to provide free
school milk for some years. In 1969 eligibility to Free School Lunches was explicitly linked to receipt of the
Income Support and also to receipt of Family Credit when it was introduced in 1970. Since 1980 Free
School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens have only been associated with Income Support and Family
Credit.11
the price. This has been increasing over time relative to the overall retail price index, the
food price index and real incomes: the average real price of a school lunch in 1992 was
£1.00 compared to £0.55 in 1984. There is very little cross-section variation in price
16.
All children have the option of not participating in the lunch provided by the
school. Instead they may bring a packed lunch from home, for which no subsidies were
available, or they may return home for lunch, or they may go without lunch. Households
receiving Free School Lunches in our data received 9.6 per week on average. This
compares with average weekly food expenditure by non-entitled and entitled households
with school-aged children of £65.68 and £44.21 respectively in our data.
17
The cash transfer programs were administrated by the UK Government
Department of Health and Social Security and recipients were informed of the associated
in-kind entitlements. However, the Department of Education administered the Free
School Lunch program, parents had to make an additional application and this extra
administrative hurdle has to be cleared before Free School Lunches could be obtained.
Welfare Milk Tokens were available to households with a child aged 0-4, where
one member of the household is receiving Income Support or Family Credit. Again,
households receiving Family Credit were no longer entitled to Welfare Milk Tokens after
April 1988. Although the transfer is not explicitly for children, the level of entitlement is
fixed at one Welfare Milk Token per day for each child aged 0-4 in the household. A
token could be exchanged for one pint (0.56 liters) of milk at many grocery stores. The
extent to which shop-keepers offer an informal cash-out is unknown.
18 16.6% of
16 We do observe small variance in weekly expenditure in the data for those who pay for lunches. This is
most likely due to variation in school absenteeism across households which we cannot observe in the data.
17 The US programs which are closest to UK Free School Lunches are the National School Lunch Program
and the School Breakfast Program. These are for children from poor households and respectively provide
free school lunches for 15 million children (at a 2005 cost of $7 billion) and a free breakfast for 7 million
(at a cost of $2 billion).
18 The penalty for exchanging Welfare Milk Tokens for items other than milk is that the shop will no longer
be reimbursed for welfare milk tokens. This is an important deterrent to the extent that welfare clients
represent a large customer base for many shops.12
households with pre-school aged children received Welfare Milk Tokens in 1987. The
market value of the average weekly transfer was £2.98 for 9.0 pints, compared with
average weekly milk expenditure of (non-) recipient households with young children of
(£4.28) £2.80
19. The real price of milk has been rising over time relative to the overall
price index and the food price index
20. In 1992 a pint of milk cost £0.33 on average.
Day Care Milk is available to all registered childcare facilities and is distributed to
all children irrespective of parental income. Children receive 1/3
rd of a pint each day they
attend day care. While, these programs are not as extensive as the US Food Stamp
program (where 2005 expenditure exceeded $28 billion) the results here may be relevant
to any program where the transfer is made to one individual (typically the mother) within
the household on behalf of other (or all) household members.
3. Family Expenditure Survey Data Description
The Family Expenditure Surveys (FES) are stratified random samples of
approximately seven thousand responding households each year
21; they are conducted
continuously over time and collect expenditure information in fine detail, together with
information about household composition, characteristics, and levels of income by
source. The household food expenditure data is thought to be particularly accurate since it
is collected through detailed diary records kept by all spenders
22. This is complemented
with data on durable goods and on regular bills, such as domestic energy, insurances, etc.
which are recorded over three months. Our data contains household level expenditure
derived from the individual level weekly diaries completed by all individuals aged over
15. The data that we have access to is aggregated to the household level and averaged
19 Non-recipient households tend to have fewer children.
20 Although, shortly after this period the demise of the Milk Marketing Board’s price fixing agreement
resulted in considerable price falls at the major supermarket chains.
21 It was merged with the National Food Survey in 2002 and became the Expenditure and Food Survey.
22 See Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) on the reliability of income data in the FES. See Kelmsley et al
(1980) for details of sampling methods. Tanner (1996) gives checks on the reliability of expenditures data.13
over the two diary weeks
23. The Family Expenditure Surveys are the main vehicle for
expenditure, tax and social security policy analysis in the UK (see Johnson, Stark and
Webb (1990)) since they contain details of welfare receipts (including in-kind transfers)
and tax payments as well as sufficient information to derive reasonably accurate estimates
of tax liabilities and welfare entitlements
24. The data used here is obtained by pooling the
1981 to 1992 surveys to give 29,222 households containing either dependent school-age
children or pre-school children or both (excluding multiple-family households).
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the households in the data broken down by
whether the household was surveyed pre- or post-reform and by cash program receipt.
Income Support recipients (denoted IS>0) and Family Credit recipients (FC>0) are much
poorer than the group who received neither (IS=FC=0). For the Income Support group,
households became smaller post reform, largely because of the dramatic growth of lone
parents on out-of-work welfare. The data shows small numbers who receive but who are
not apparently eligible – just 2% of the IS=FC=0 group receive Free School Lunches or
Welfare Milk Tokens pre-reform and just 1% post-reform. One difficulty with the data is
that once Family Credit entitlement is established it can then last for up to 6 months (12
months prior to the reform). Indeed, it was the practice of some schools to provide Free
School Lunches for a whole school year so that those in receipt of Family Credit or
Income Support at the beginning of the school year may have still been receiving them
more than nine moths later, at the end of the year, even though they were no longer
eligible on current circumstances. More serious is that 9% of the Family Credit recipient
group post-reform receives Free School Lunches and 4% are in receipt of Welfare Milk
Tokens. Post-reform these should be ineligible and it seems likely that this would have
arisen because Family Credit recipients just prior to the reform could continue to receive
the associated in-kind transfers for up to 12 months. This is confirmed in Figure 1 which
23 Alcohol expenditure counts as non-food expenditure in our analysis.
24 We compute entitlements on the basis of recorded incomes, children, etc. using a very detailed routine
based on the Institute for Fiscal Studies' TAXBEN program. See Giles and McCrae (1995).14
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Means (standard deviations)
Households with children
Time period Variable IS>0 FC>0 IS=FC=0
# adults 2.09 (1.12) 1.95 (0.74) 2.22 (0.65)
# children 0-4 0.64 (0.77) 0.64 (0.82) 0.53 (0.71)
# children 5-15 1.26 (1.11) 1.44 (1.17) 1.23 (0.95)
lone parent 0.32 0.26 0.04
Free School Lunch receipt 0.40 0.47 0.02
Welfare Milk Token receipt 0.37 0.34 0.02
Pre-reform
Day Care Milk receipt 0.14 0.11 0.07
# adults 1.75 (1.00) 1.92 (0.80) 2.15 (0.63)
# children 0-4 0.72 (0.78) 0.62 (0.78) 0.58 (0.72)
# children 5-15 1.16 (1.11) 1.49 (1.15) 1.17 (0.95)
Proportion lone parent 0.50 0.31 0.05
Free School Lunch receipt 0.31 0.09 0.01
Welfare Milk Token receipt 0.41 0.04 0.01
Post-reform
Day Care Milk receipt 0.11 0.06 0.02
Note: IS>0 denotes Income Support receipt, FC>0 Family Credit receipt and IS=FC=0 receipt of neither
shows the proportions of households with any school age children who are recorded as
being in receipt of Free School Lunches. Similarly, Figure 2 shows the proportion of
households with a pre-school child who were in receipt of Welfare Milk Tokens. The
reform took place at the beginning of April 1988, one quarter the way through the year,
and providing a household received Income Support both pre and post-reform, or Family
Credit pre-reform, then it was eligible for the nutrition programs. Neither Figure1 nor 2
suggests any important time series trends.
Pre-reform Family Credit had a run-on period of 12 months because of the rule
that changes in circumstances were ignored. If the change in receipt had been
instantaneous following the change in eligibility we would expect the figure for Family
Credit recipients in 1988 to be approximately one quarter of the 1987 level. In fact, the
proportion is almost one-half in the case of Free School Lunches and just over one-third
in the case of Welfare Milk Tokens. This is consistent with there being a substantial lag
between implementation of the policy change and actual receipt of the associated cash15
Figure 1 Free School Lunch receipt by group and calendar year:




































Figure 2 Welfare Milk Token receipt by group and calendar year:




































transfer program – a lag that lasts through to 1989 for cases establishing a claim in the
first quarter of 1988. The administrative lags in the welfare system are exacerbated by the
delivery mechanisms for Free School Lunches, which were typically awarded for a school
term in advance and for Welfare Milk Tokens were typically made available for a month
in advance. However, after 1989 the proportion of the Family Credit recipients receiving
Free School Lunches is reassuringly small. This is small enough to be consistent with
Free School Lunch receipt amongst Family Credit recipients arising from previous
eligibility to Income Support, because many households who are unemployed will have
found low paying work and may move from Income Support to Family Credit and still
receive nutrition transfers for a period.
Thus, apart from the immediate aftermath of the policy change, the reform seems
to have clean effects. Indeed, we do not require that there be no measurement error. In the
difference-in-difference analysis we are, in any event, estimating an intention-to-treat so
the presence of non-compliers are not problematic. And in the case of our structural
analysis we are explicitly estimating a local average treatment effect i.e. the effects of
losing nutrition receipt due to the reform, not the effects of losing nutrition receipt per
se.
25
Table 2 shows the levels of expenditure on milk and non-milk food for relevant
groups of the population of households with children pre and post reform. Milk spending
fell dramatically - by 38% for the IS=FC=0 group reflecting changing tastes and
reductions in prices. The fall for the Income Support recipients, who retained their
eligibility to Welfare Milk Tokens, was a similar order of magnitude – 32%. In contrast
the group that lost their eligibility to Welfare Milk Tokens showed significant rises in
milk spending – 69% for those with only pre-school children.
25 Our preferred estimates include data for the whole period 1981-1992. We have also estimated both the
difference-in-differences and structural models dropping April 1988 through March 1989 which may be
considered a phase-in period for the reform. Difference-in-differences results are slightly higher but lose
precision whereas structural budget share estimates are unchanged. In view of this and the short post-reform17
Note that households receiving Income Support are on average slightly poorer
than households receiving Family Credit, who are on average considerably poorer than
those receiving neither. Thus a comparison between the Income Support and Family
Credit recipients illuminates the effect of losing Free School Lunches and Welfare Milk
Tokens across two groups of low income households. The decrease in total expenditure
for the Income Support recipient group across the reform arises because of the strong
increase in the representation of lone parents, who have substantially lower household
income, in this category.
Table 3 illustrates the consequences of the April 1988 benefit reform for eligibility
to the relevant cash transfer programs. Pre-reform, eligibility to both Income Support and
Family Credit provided eligibility to Welfare Milk Tokens for households with young
children and Free School Lunches for older children. Post-reform, only Income Support
gave eligibility to these nutrition programs. Of households with only children aged 0-4 (5-
15), 2.6% (3.9%) lost their Family Credit-based eligibility to Welfare Milk Tokens (Free
School Lunches), and of households with children in both age groups 5.4% lost their
Family Credit-based eligibility to both programs.
26
We concentrate on milk and non-milk food spending in our analysis. Milk is all forms of
liquid milk, and food is all food including meals consumed away from home. Table 4
summarizes the gross features of nutrition program eligibility and receipt separately. For
Free School Lunches there are just 2.4% of ineligibles that are in receipt (ineligible
participants). The overall participation rate for the Free School Lunch program is 58%.
Since families in receipt of Free School Lunches contained 1.89 school age children and
those families not in receipt of Free School Lunches contained an average of 1.61
children our estimate of 12% of households which corresponds to 14% of school children
observation window, our preferred estimates include data for the whole period including April 1988 through
March 1989.
26 Eligibility for Welfare Milk Tokens or Free School Lunches requires household eligibility to an
associated cash transfer and children in the relevant age range. The importance of the distinction between
receipt and eligibility groupings is emphasized in the next section.18
that receive free school lunches
27. Table 4 also highlights similar features for Welfare
Milk Tokens and Day Care Milk for households with only pre-school age children. The
larger proportion of ineligible participants is likely to be due, in the case of Welfare Milk
Tokens, to our inability to identify expectant mothers currently without pre-school aged
children, who would be eligible during pregnancy. In the case of Day Care Milk, the
survey question routing prevents us from observing ineligible recipients.
Table 5 shows the number of households receiving multiple nutrition transfers
according to eligibility. Overall participation by ineligibles (1.7% above the diagonal) is a
rather small proportion of the sample, while eligible non-participants are the much larger
group below the diagonal (28.5%).
Table 2 Expenditure Patterns Pre and Post Reform by Group (£ pw, 1997 prices)
Welfare program IS>0 FC>0 FC>0 FC=IS=0



















































Note: Eligibilities in the table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table where
eligibility is conditional on transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the authors on request.
27 Official figures for 1983 are 13.4% of families benefit from Free School Lunches and in 1983 recipient
families had 1.92 children compared with 1.60 for non-recipient families, so that the implied proportion of
children receiving Free School Lunches was 16.1% (Department of Social Security (1995)).19
Table 3 Cash Transfer Program Reform and Eligibility
Number of eligible households (% of age group)
Pre-reform Post-reform Both
Program Childrens’ ages # % # % # %
0-4 only 686 (16.3) 421 (14.7) 1107 (15.6)
5-15 only 1399 (13.5) 597 (10.8) 1996 (12.6) IS receipt
0-4 & 5-15 628 (17.9) 315 (14.7) 943 (16.7)
0-4 only 94 (2.2) 74 (2.6) 168 (2.4)
5-15 only 249 (2.4) 218 (3.9) 467 (2.9) FC receipt
0-4 & 5-15 122 (3.5) 115 (5.4) 237 (4.2)
Note: Eligibilities in the table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table where
eligibility is conditional on cash transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the authors on
request.
Table 4 Program by Program Eligibility and Participation
Number of households (row percent)
Program Eligible Not receiving Receiving Total
No 17426 (97.4) 426 (2.4) 17888
Yes 1521 (41.8) 2122 (58.2) 3643
Free
School
Lunch Total 18947 (88.0) 2584 (12.0) 21538
No 10016 (97.4) 268 (2.6) 10284
Yes 603 (24.6) 1852 (75.4) 2455
Welfare
Milk
Tokens Total 10619 (83.4) 2120 (16.6) 12739
No 8140 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 8140
Yes 3750 (81.5) 849 (18.5) 4599
Day
Care
Milk Total 11890 (93.3) 849 (6.7) 12739
Notes: UK Family Expenditure Surveys 1982-92. The dataset comprises 29222 households with children
from pooled cross-sections. Free school lunch numbers are for households with school-age children 5-15.
Welfare milk tokens and daycare milk numbers are for households with children 0-4. Eligibilities in the
table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table where eligibility is conditional
on cash transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the authors on request.20
Table 5 Multiple Program Eligibility and Participation: households (row percent)
Number of programs received Number of
programs
entitled to: 0 1 2 3 Total
17071 (97.7) 391 (2.2) 7 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 17469
6731 (70.1) 2757 (28.7) 100 (1.0) 13 (0.1) 9601




3 72 (9.5) 226 (30.0) 300 (39.8) 156 (20.7) 754
Total 24188 (82.8) 4065 (13.9) 800 (2.7) 169 (0.6) 29222
Note: Eligibilities in the table are calculated conditional on the cash transfer receipt. A similar table where
eligibility is conditional on cash transfer eligibility rather than receipt is available from the authors on
request.
4. Modeling Household Food and Milk Expenditures
The simplest way to approach the issue of identifying the extent to which
expenditure patterns are affected by changes in entitlements is to consider the following
straightforward model
(1) ki i k i ki s       X T
where ski is the budget share for household i on good k, Ti is a vector of participation rates
in the three nutrition programmes for household i and Xi and  ki are observable and
unobservable controls respectively. We are seeking to estimate the vector k , the response
of expenditure shares to participation in each programme. Since the Ti are potentially
endogenous we pursue a number of identification strategies. Firstly, we use the 1988
reform as a natural experiment. Observations are grouped according to Family Credit
receipt pre- and post-reform, since this determined loss of eligibility to Free School
Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens. Secondly, individual micro-data controls for observed
differences between the treatment and control groups and changes in characteristics over
time. Endogenous group composition can be allowed for by defining intention to treat as
alternatively Family Credit receipt or entitlement. Finally a structural model, which
imposes a parametric form for preferences onto equation (1), is estimated which allows
theoretical cross-equation restrictions to be imposed and tested. We adopt restrictive
distributional assumptions in order to estimate the determinants of program participation21
and budget shares. This allows us to exploit the reform, incorporate the distinctions
between each program, and include Day Care Milk within a coherent framework, and
thereby test the underlying theory.
4.1 Difference in differences using grouped data
We grouped the data into cells of monthly averages (prices are observed monthly
and we can group the data by interview month since they come from a continuous survey
that is in the field throughout the year) and estimated demand share equations for milk
and non-milk food which included a before-and-after dummy variable to capture any
differences between the pre- and post-reform periods and an interaction between this and
the Family Credit recipient proportion. The data was further grouped into those with pre-
school children only (for whom the reform removed welfare milk tokens from the Family
Credit group), those with school age children (for whom the reform removed Free School
Lunches), and those households that contained both age groups (for who the reform
removed both Welfare Milk Tokens and Free School Lunches from the Family Credit
group).
The share equations are detailed in Table 6 and contain no further covariates and
so provide Wald estimates of the effects of the programs. The data clearly shows
significant falls in the shares over time. The interaction term is included to capture the
effect of losing eligibility to the nutrition programs.
We find that, after controlling for the proportion in receipt of Family Credit and
Income Support, there is an insignificant fall in the milk share and a significant rise in the
food share at the time of the reform, but that the difference between the groups who kept
and lost their eligibility to nutrition programs was not significant in either equation.
However, the estimates are correctly signed – the loss of Welfare Milk Tokens for those
with young children gave rise to a large increase in the milk share and a large fall in the
food share; the loss of Free School Lunches for those with older children resulted in a
large increase in the food share and a large increase in the milk share.22
Table 6 Monthly Mean Food and Milk Share Regression Coefficients (s.e’s)





























































2 0.543 0.695 0.514 0.116 0.088 0.115
Notes: Milk shares are multiplied by 100 and food shares by 10 for the sake of exposition. Data is
weighted by the number of observations in each cell.
It might be tempting to rely on this simple difference in differences methodology
as has been done elsewhere
28. However, even if we assume that the reform is a clean
natural experiment, restrictions are required for the aggregate data to be consistent with
consumer theory. In particular, incomes are changing over time, within the treatment and
control groups, and only if changes in the distribution of income (total expenditure) did
not affect budget shares can we meaningfully aggregate the data into group means. This
condition would imply that preferences are quasi-homothetic, a restriction that is typically
rejected in micro-data
29.
4.2 Difference in differences using individual micro-data
We can overcome the aggregation problem by applying the difference in
differences method to the micro-data. This has the further advantage that it allows us to
control for other observables that vary across time differently for the treatments and
28 See Yelowitz (1995) for an example which uses difference in differences to analyse the effects of a health
care reform.
29 See Blundell et al. (1993).23
controls. The analysis controls for the number and ages of children, income, Family
Credit and Income Support receipt/eligibility, and pre- or post-reform observation. Table
6 reports only the coefficient on the interaction between a post-reform dummy variable
and the intention to treat dummy of equation (1). The scope of the nutrition programs -
milk for households with pre-school children and food for school-aged children; and the
nature of the reform - whereby the working poor lost eligibility, suggests a number of
possible difference-in-differences designs. A natural treatment group throughout are those
households who lose eligibility to the nutrition program (i.e. the working poor). Natural
candidates for control groups are households always eligible (i.e. the non-working poor),
and households never eligible (i.e. the working non-poor). The coefficients of interest
from nine alternative definitions of the difference-in-differences for the three budget
shares are summarised in Table 7. Grouping is according to cash transfer receipt, where
the non-working poor receive Income Support, the working poor receive Family Credit,
and the working non-poor receive neither.
An important assumption of difference-in-differences is exogenous group
composition, whereby individuals must not be able to self-select into treatment status.
Cash transfer programme participation is obviously a choice and grouping according to
Family Credit receipt status may be problematic. Furthermore, grouping by Family Credit
entitlement status post-reform is questionable because households may have altered
behaviour in response to the reform which changes entitlement. In order to address this
Table 8 groups according to pre-reform Family Credit eligibility status
30. It is possible to
focus on the effect of losing Welfare Milk Token eligibility by considering households
with only pre-school aged children. Estimates for this sample are presented in the upper
three rows of Tables 7 and 8. The effect of losing Free School Lunch eligibility is isolated
by sampling households with only school-aged children, presented in the middle three
30 Entitlement to Family Credit is calculated using post-reform household characteristics (pooled cross
section data) on the basis of pre-reform Family Credit entitlement rules.24
rows. The combined effect of losing eligibility to either or both nutrition programs uses
the full sample and is presented in the last three rows.
The general pattern of results in Table 7 implies that losing Welfare Milk Token
eligibility increases the milk budget share and causes some substitution away from non-
milk food; while losing Free School Lunches causes some increase in milk share and a
large increase in non-milk food share. To understand the implications of these effects note
that, for the average recipient household, Welfare Milk Tokens were exchanged for 9
pints per week with a market price of £3. The average household receiving Free School
Lunches had 9.6 per week which were worth £10. Income support recipients are the more
natural control group for the treatments of losing nutrition program eligibility since both
groups are relatively poor. The estimates corresponding to this definition of control group
suggests that losing Welfare Milk Tokens increased the budget share of milk by 0.0096 -
from about 0.17 to about 0.26. This represents an increase in milk expenditure at the
mean of £1.60 and suggests that Welfare Milk Tokens crowded out private milk
expenditure by more than half of their value. The loss of Welfare Milk Tokens to
households with young children also affects the share of non-milk food, but only by -
0.0047 implying a small effect of -£0.80 as some non-milk food spending is switched to
milk. For households with only school age children, the loss of Free School Lunch
eligibility leads to an increase in non-milk food expenditure of about £3. This implies a
non-milk food expenditure crowd-out of less than one third of the Free School Lunch
value, although this is not precisely estimated.
The general pattern of results in Table 8 supports the findings in Table 7.
Although the estimates are smaller and less precise, they also imply that losing Welfare
Milk Token eligibility increases the milk share and leads to some substitution away from
non-milk food; while losing Free School Lunch eligibility causes some increase in milk
share and a large increase in non-milk food.
For Free School Lunches another difference-in-differences grouping is possible
which is not based on the 1988 reform. Free School Lunches are only available during
term time, and school summer holidays in Scotland are approximately one month earlier25







(FCr=0) DD p-value DD p-value DD p-value
Lose WMT Keep WMT (ISr>0) 0.9599 0.0306 -0.0472 0.0000 0.0488 0.0000
Lose WMT Never WMT (ISr=0) 0.3389 0.1091 -0.0247 0.9143 0.0092 0.0926
Children
0-4 only
Lose WMT Either WMT 0.6494 0.0067 -0.0360 0.0000 0.0290 0.0000
Lose FSL Keep FSL (ISr>0) 0.2304 0.4597 0.1757 0.2543 0.1987 0.4091
Lose FSL Never FSL (ISr=0) -0.0562 0.7316 0.2612 0.0013 0.2556 0.0052
Children
5-15 only
Lose FSL Either FSL 0.0871 0.7573 0.2185 0.0003 0.2272 0.0024
Lose WMT/FSL Keep WMT/FSL (ISr>0) 0.4000 0.1317 0.0992 0.3636 0.1392 0.2001
Lose WMT/FSL Never WMT/FSL (ISr=0) 0.1805 0.1957 0.3634 0.0000 0.3815 0.0000 All
Lose WMT/FSL Either WMT/FSL 0.2903 0.0570 0.2313 0.0000 0.2603 0.0000
Note: Cells indicate difference-in-difference estimates and associated p-values from separate budget share regressions on individual data. Controls for log
income and its square are included. WMT denotes Welfare Milk Tokens, FSL is Free School Lunches, FCr is Family Credit receipt and ISr is income support
receipt. Milk and food budget shares are multiplied by respectively 100 and 10 for presentation. The first three substantive rows are estimated on households
containing only pre-school children in order to focus on Welfare Milk Tokens. The middle three rows are estimated on households with only school-aged
children in order to focus on Free School Lunches. The last three rows are estimates from the full sample of all households with children.26







(FCe=0) DD p-value DD p-value DD p-value
Lose WMT Keep WMT (ISe>0) 0.1995 0.5851 0.1489 0.3903 0.1689 0.6316
Lose WMT Never WMT (ISe=0) 0.3687 0.1258 -0.4198 0.0002 -0.3829 0.0001
Children
0-4 only
Lose WMT Either WMT 0.2841 0.1398 -0.1355 0.0010 -0.1070 0.0005
Lose FSL Keep FSL (ISe>0) 0.1611 0.4472 0.0396 0.7088 0.0557 0.6966
Lose FSL Never FSL (ISe=0) 0.0771 0.6193 0.1898 0.0290 0.1975 0.0806
Children
5-15 only
Lose FSL Either FSL 0.1191 0.4847 0.1147 0.0299 0.1266 0.0742
Lose WMT/FSL Keep WMT/FSL (ISe>0) 0.0895 0.6283 0.0563 0.4836 0.0653 0.7093
Lose WMT/FSL Never WMT/FSL (ISe=0) 0.2391 0.0742 0.2661 0.0000 0.2900 0.0000 All
Lose WMT/FSL Either WMT/FSL 0.1643 0.0797 0.1612 0.0000 0.1776 0.0000
Note: Clarifications the same as for Table 6 plus FCe is Family Credit eligibility and ISe is income support eligibility.27
than the rest of the UK.
31 Inspection of the data does indeed confirm that Scotland has
different summer school holiday timing. Table 9 presents estimates of this
Scotland/non-Scotland school holidays difference-in-differences design. The relevant
sample contains households with school aged children with an entitlement to Free
School Lunches. If the survey interview takes place during school holidays, Free
School Lunches cannot be provided, despite eligibility, and no substitute is offered.
These holiday difference-in-differences show average food expenditure share
increases throughout: increasing on average by 0.036 according to cash transfer
receipt grouping and by 0.016 for cash transfer eligibility grouping, although the latter
are not well determined. Comparable reform-based estimates are in the middle panes
of Tables 7 (somewhat smaller) and 8 (about the same) respectively. The significant
differences for cash transfer receipt-based groupings are driven by Scotland holidays
as treatments and rest of UK as controls rather than vice versa. This could be picking
up other distinctive features of summer holiday expenditure in Scotland. Concerns
about endogenous group composition suggest that it is most important to reconcile the
cash transfer eligibility-based results. Here there are no significant differences and the
point estimates are quite close.








School day School holiday DD p-value DD p-value
Scotland non-Scotland 0.2088 0.0289 0.0705 0.5445
non-Scotland Scotland 0.5244 0.0270 0.2588 0.0609
Free School
Lunch
eligible Scotland/non non/Scotland 0.3666 0.0268 0.1646 0.3095
Note: The sample includes households with children age 5-15 who are eligible for Free School
Lunches. Family Credit eligibility is calculated on observed characteristics and pre-reform rules. The
last row of the table represents both treatment groups together (holidays in any region) and both control
groups together (school days in any region).
31 Children in private schools typically have longer summer holidays. We do not have data on who
attends private school but, from other sources, we know that they are only 6% of the school population.
Households with children in private schools are very unlikely to be eligible for Free School Lunches.28
4.3 Structural demand system with endogenous nutrition program participation
The importance of nutrition program non-participation was illustrated earlier
in Table 4, and this motivates modeling endogeneity of receipt in the budget share
equations which are of primary interest. Using the micro-data allowed us to control for
observable differences across individuals within each group. However, the implicit
assumption in the previous sub-section is that the treatment is randomly assigned
conditional on the observed control variables included. That is, there are no
unobserved determinants of program eligibility or participation that are correlated
with budget shares. Unobserved determinants of participation are likely to affect
budget shares – for example, households with members who dislike milk are going to
be less likely to participate in the milk programs and will also have a lower milk
budget share, conditional on participation. Indeed, it also possible that even the
condition that the determinants of eligibility need to be independent of the shares will
be violated. This is because, although eligibility is a deterministic function of a set of
characteristics, not all of these are observable in our data
32, and eligibility is measured
with error.
In order to deal with the endogeneity of eligibility or receipt we adopt a more
structural approach to the specification of equation (1). Here we impose a structure to
the way that the X’s affect the shares, and we also allow for endogenous program
participation by assuming that the unobservable determinants of budget shares and
participation are jointly normally distributed. We continue to exploit the reform for
identification, since nutrition program eligibility is an important determinant of
participation, as was shown in Table 4. The structure allows us to impose the
restrictions of consumer theory and test for crowd-out, altruism and agency by
incorporating relevant features of all the programs in a coherent demand framework.
This demand system with endogenous program participation is modeled using a
multivariate generalization of Heckman (1979). Adopting this method has the
32 For example, eligibility for Income Support depends on wealth and child disability also plays a role
but neither is observed with precision.29
advantage that we can incorporate Day Care Milk into the analysis - something that
was not possible with difference-in-differences because this program was not
reformed.
The FES data has been the subject of detailed modeling by Blundell et al
(1993) and Banks et al (1997) which both show that a generalization of the Almost
Ideal Demand System which allows for budget shares to be quadratic functions of
total expenditure are strongly preferred to the original log linear specification of
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Moreover, non-parametric modeling of the nature of
Engle curves in this data has been explored in Blundell et al (1998) who show that
non-(log)-linearity is a feature of the data but that a quadratic in log total expenditure
is a good approximation to non-parametric Engel curves. None of this work allowed
for welfare program participation. Thus, here, we assume that the milk and non-milk
food budget shares of household i are given by




i j kj i k i k k ik p y y s      γ T ln ln ln
2
where the subscript k refers to either milk or non-milk food, pk is the respective real
price, y is real total expenditure
33, ik is a random disturbance, k may be allowed to
depend on household demographics, and the vector
p T contains dummy variables
which indicate participation in the transfer programs, p stands for program (i.e. Day
Care Milk, Welfare Milk Tokens and Free School Lunches)
34. Now consider the
control function selectivity adjustment. That is, if
* p
i T are latent variables




i Z is a vector of household
33 Total expenditure here includes housing costs. We control for all of the aspects of the 1988 reforms
and make appropriate adjustments to Housing Benefit. Results where total expenditure excludes
housing costs are similar.
34 We do not estimate a more fully disaggregated demand system including a breakdown of other
expenditure items such as alcohol, tobacco, services, transport, etc. To the extent that some of these
commodity groups are exclusively adult goods (and some even may have negative externalities on child
development) we might be able to draw some further informal inferences about child welfare. However,
since our data is silent on child development issues we refrain from further dis-aggregation and confine
our attention to agency and altruism effects on food expenditure.30
demographic characteristics which includes transfer entitlements ,
p
i E , and the
p
i  are
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A selection issue arises when there is a correlation between unobservables across the
program participation and expenditure share equations, i.e. if   0 , cov  ik
p
i   .
4.4 Identification of the structural model
The requirements for identifying the demand system in equation (2) are that
prices are exogenous and this is usually thought to apply, at least at the micro level.
However, identifying the conditional demand system with endogenous conditioning of
equations (2) and (3) together requires somewhat more. Assumptions made to identify
the model are discussed below. The stochastic specification of the error terms is
assumed to be multivariate normal, with an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix.
Multivariate normality is assumed on the grounds that it is quite conventional, allows
a flexible correlation structure, and leads to a computationally tractable likelihood
function. The likelihood is a generalization of the multivariate Probit selection model
with three correlated endogenous variables (transfer program participation) and two
correlated (budget shares) equations of interest:
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where 2 and 3 are the bi-variate and tri-variate Normal densities, and the upper
and lower limits of integration are given by either
p p Z  ,   if 1 
p T ,
or ,
p p Z  if 0 
p T , and otherwise    , respectively. The model is estimated
by Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
While it is possible to rely purely on these stochastic assumptions, the context
of our problem suggests some exclusion restrictions which may be imposed for
stronger (non-parametric) identification of the model. First and foremost, we exploit
changes in the levels of entitlement and eligibility that have occurred over time
through reforms and imperfect indexation that then induce changes in the levels of
participation, given household characteristics. The most important of these policy31
changes was the 1988 reform that removed eligibility to Free School Lunches and
Welfare Milk Tokens entirely for the working poor but not for the non-working poor.
Embedding a difference-in-differences design into a structural model in this way is
essentially a form of grouped instrumental variables. Against the background of a
reform, imperfect indexation and real price changes, additional exclusion restrictions
can be considered but are not required for identification.
A further restriction is suggested by the take-it-or-leave-it nature that nutrition
programs typically have. Free School Lunches are available in only one quality, at a
given time and place. For a given quality, as income rises from a low level the
probability of participation will rise as the desired quality is below the offered quality;
but beyond that income level further increases in income lead to a decrease in the
participation probability. In the case of Free School Lunches we may capture quality
by price relative to the price of (market) food which varies over time
35. If the price of
school lunches is high relative to the price of food then this is an indication of their
higher quality to the extent that the price reflects the costs of raw materials and other
inputs
36. We use a quadratic in income to capture the inverted “U” shape relationship
between the participation probability and income that arises because of the take-it-or-
leave-it nature. In addition, a further exclusion restriction is that benefit-year dummies
only enter into the program participation equation. This is in order to capture the
effects of other changes in transfer programs, over and above entitlement value – such
as administrative procedures. We would argue that these should not affect the budget
share beyond the number of in-kind units received. For the budget share, month-of-
year dummies capture seasonality and a quadratic time trend is added
37.
Finally, it is important to note that it is a maintained assumption that total
expenditure is exogenous. It is useful to state why this is assumed and what the
35 The price is the average price observed in the data for those that buy school lunches within each
region. In principle this price is fixed nationally although we do find that there is a small cross section
variation, especially after the mid 1980’s.
36 Over the time period considered here the real price of school lunches increased by 10%, while the
real price of food fell by 13% and the real wages of unskilled workers remained approximately static.
37 Similar results were obtained from including a full set of month of year and calendar year dummies.32
consequences are. Eligibility for Welfare Milk Tokens or Free School Lunches
requires both household receipt of an associated cash transfer and children in the
relevant age range. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume Welfare Milk Tokens
and Free School Lunches are available for those who are eligible to the associated
cash transfer according to the post-reform rules
38, not only those who are in receipt of
the cash transfer.
39 Extending our model to explicitly incorporate participation in the
associated cash transfer programs would imply endogenizing income.
40 The
consequence of this extension would be to complicate the model such that further
identification assumptions or restrictions would be required. We appeal to
intertemporal separability to substantiate our assumption that total expenditure is
exogenous and we consider relaxing this to be out of scope for the current paper. It
seems unlikely that this is important for the estimates: while the assumption of
exogenous total expenditure is rejected by Blundell et al (1995) and Browning and
Meghir (1991), their results suggest only modest differences in estimates.
4.5 Results and Discussion
Model estimates are presented in Table 10
41. The probability of participating in
a nutrition program is an increasing function of the market value of the entitlement
and falls with income. These results are consistent with both stigma and transactions
38 This is in contrast to the difference-in-differences analysis in Table 8 where grouping is on the basis
of eligibility to the associated cash transfer according to pre-reform rules throughout. Using pre-reform
rules in the structural model lowers goodness-of-fit for the relevant program participation equations,
reduces precision, but inference is qualitatively unchanged.
39 Official figures for cash transfer take-up are 91.0% for Income Support and 84.0% for Family Credit
in 1997. Our calculations suggest that the take-up of Free School Lunches (Welfare Milk Tokens)
associated with Income Support was 53.4 (66.5) % and associated with Family Credit was 58.2 (67.5)
%.
40 Our preferred estimates are presented in Table 5. In alternative specifications the entitlement value of
the cash transfer was included as an explanatory variable in the associated nutrition program
participation equations. The motivation was that a more financially attractive cash benefit may make the
whole cash and in-kind transfer bundle more attractive. This would help identification to the extent that
cash entitlement need not appear in the budget share equations. Coefficients on cash transfer
entitlement turned out to be insignificant once nutrition program entitlement value was included. We
take this as evidence in support of our simpler specification.
41 Table 10 presents our preferred specification and this choice needs to be motivated. Including the
number of transfers in budget shares and value of entitlement in participation was preferred over other
combinations in a likelihood ratio test. Quadratic income terms in the participation equations were
insignificant, as were price-income interactions in the milk program participation equations.33
cost explanations. We find that the level of entitlement has a positive and significant
effect on participation in all cases. Income has a negative effect on milk transfer take-
up and the effect on free school lunches is insignificantly positive
42. The interaction
between income and the real price of school lunches captures the idea that, if quality is
a normal good, then at low levels of income an increase in quality will decrease take-
up, but at high levels of income an increase in quality will increase take-up. Thus as
income rises the interaction with ln y should turn from positive to negative and this is
reflected in the positive effect on the interaction between the quality and income and
the negative effect of the interaction with the square of income. In fact our estimates
imply that at levels of income in excess of £35 (which is close to the minimum in the
data) the negative effect dominates implying that the quality is so low that even the
poorest households would prefer a higher quality. Finally, the correlation between
unobservables that determine participation are not presented in the table, but are
statistically significant, which supports our joint modeling of program participation.
There are few estimates for milk elasticities available in the literature but the
results here compare well with those from the National Food Survey (National Food
Survey Committee (1989)) but, unlike those, are well determined.
The coefficients on the number of free school lunches and the number of free
pints of milk allow us to compute the extent to which these transfers are crowding out
private expenditure of households. The mean food share of households not receiving
Free School Lunches is 0.2433 representing a real expenditure of £67.11 per week so
a fall in the share of 0.0006 represents a reduction in food expenditure of £0.40 per
42 The level of entitlement to Free School Lunches is the product of the number of children of school
age and the price (times five during term time because there are five school days in a week). Since we
already include the number of school aged children our estimates imply that participation does not vary
with quality except through its interaction with income.34
Table 10. Expenditure Shares and Nutrition Program Participation: ML Estimates
Dependent Variable Budget Shares Program Participation
Category Milk non-milk food free school lunch day care milk welfare milk
tokens
Intercept 10.8710 0.4130 6.0763 0.1988 0.1058 1.4436 1.1522 0.2095 2.2693 0.3611
Program # free school lunches 0.0309 0.0025 -0.0060 0.0015
# day care milk pints -0.1055 0.0246 0.0026 0.0014
# welfare milk tokens -0.1095 0.0030 0.0025 0.0019
Entitlement value 0.5050 0.1293 0.2678 0.0662 0.2010 0.0706
Prices & incomes Ln p(milk) 2.6988 0.5385
Ln p(non-milk food) 1.5095 0.8147 0.6300 0.4475
Ln y -2.5662 0.1511 -0.9637 0.0690 0.0890 0.2668 -0.2275 0.0393 -0.2524 0.0772
(Ln y)
2 0.1207 0.0145 0.0007 0.0064
(Ln y)*lunch price 1.1653 0.2855
(Ln y)
2*lunch price -0.1943 0.0511
Demographics # children 0-4 0.4209 0.0125 0.0752 0.0073 0.1715 0.0336 0.1249 0.0259 0.0684 0.0926
# children 5-15 0.3431 0.0097 0.2125 0.0054 0.1164 0.0629 0.0171 0.0199 -0.0138 0.0280
# adults 0.3219 0.0124 0.2659 0.0063 -0.0412 0.0351 -0.0122 0.0425 -0.1145 0.0577
Other controls R,M,t R,M,t R,B R,B R,B
Notes: Conditional (on nutrition program participation) Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System with homogeneity and symmetry imposed. See main text for tests of these
restrictions. Mean log likelihood -3.1221. The budget share dependent variables milk and non-milk food are multiplied by 100 and 10 respectively. Asymptotic standard errors are
in italics. The reference household type is headed by a lone parent, regardless of employment status. Other controls indicated in the table but not presented are (B) dummies for 12
benefit-years, R for 10 regions, M for 11 months of year. t indicates the presence of a quadratic time trend, also parents marital and employment status interactions are included.35
lunch (all figures are in 1992 prices). Similarly, the mean milk share of households not
receiving Welfare Milk Tokens is 0.0169, which represents an expenditure of £4.25, so
reductions in the shares of 0.0011 per pint of nutrition program milk represent reductions
in milk expenditures of £0.28.
In Table 12 we present the calculated crowd out of private expenditures averaged
over each observation in the dataset. The crowd out for Free School Lunches is 15% of
their value, while for milk the figures are both close to 80% of the value. The cross
effects make intuitive sense: one pint equivalent of Welfare Milk Tokens (Day Care
Milk) reduces milk expenditure by £0.28 (£0.27)) and induces non-milk food expenditure
to rise by £0.06 (£0.07), while a Free School Lunch induces milk expenditure to rise by
£0.08 and non-milk food expenditure to fall by £0.15. The Free School Lunch effect is
small but the milk effects are quite substantial – a high proportion of the transfer is
crowded out by the household making countervailing expenditure changes.
Table 11 Estimated Elasticities: Mean (standard deviation)
Milk Food
Milk Price -0.1008 (0.0021) 0.0901 (0.0031)
Food Price 0.0901 (0.0031) -0.7355 (0.0146)
Income 0.1162 (0.0225) 0.1789 (0.0197)


























This paper has been concerned with evaluating the impact of nutrition programs
for households with children on food expenditure in the UK. We have been particularly
concerned about the extent to which the aim of these transfers can be undone by
countervailing behavior of household members. The results suggest that there is
significant crowding-out. In the case of Welfare Milk Tokens we expected a high degree
of displacement since milk is homogenous and the level of provision is large relative to
typical needs: and we found that approximately three-quarters of the transfer is offset by
reductions in milk expenditure. For Day Care Milk we found a similar effect despite the
fact that it is less of a substitute for market milk (other household members cannot
consume it) and the level of provision is low. These results do not suggest the presence of
agency problems, in that milk has essentially the same crowd out of private expenditure
regardless of whether it is given directly to children as Day Care Milk or to the mother as
Welfare Milk Tokens. As might be expected for Free School Lunches, a commodity
which may well be a poor substitute for food purchased elsewhere, we found only a
relatively small crowd out.
The results are potentially important for policy design. They imply that for in-
kind transfers to be successful, and limit crowd out of private expenditure, they should be
confined to goods where there is no close market substitute. In our analysis we find that
the mechanism for this in households with children was parental altruism rather than
agency. More generally, the results suggest strong altruistic connections especially
between young children and their parents, which imply that public transfers to the parents
have a significantly tempered effect on the children themselves, particularly the young.
While our analysis is confined to in-kind transfers the issues that we address are
relevant to other programs for households with children. Many cash transfers are intended
to improve the welfare of one type of individual but are paid to another (for example,
Child Benefit, a weekly lump sum, is paid to mothers in the UK). The finding that agency
problems are not large provides some reassurance. However, significant altruism is more37
worrying because transfers of the good to one individual in the household may crowd out
transfers from other household members.
Finally, while our analysis has uncovered significant altruism but no significant
agency effects, we are silent on the well-being of children over and above these effects. It
would be useful to know what the impact of programs intended to improve childhood
nutrition would be on long term outcomes for children. The effectiveness of such
programs depends not only on how the delivery mechanism affects how much nutrition is
delivered (which we address here) but also on the effect of a unit of nutrition consumed
(which we cannot address with our data). Thus, our analysis is relevant to evaluating the
delivery of the treatment, not the treatment itself.38
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